We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
viscosity solution in the dual sense of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation. This means that (i) V is convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q, (ii) the convex conjugate of V with respect to p is a subsolution of some Hamilton-JacobiIsaacs (HJI) equation in the viscosity sense, (iii) the concave conjugate of V with respect to q is a supersolution of a symmetric HJI equation, (iv) V(T, x, p, q) = i,j p i q j g ij (x) where p = (p i ) i∈{1,...,I} and q = (q j ) j∈{1,...,J} .
We strongly underline that in general the value functions are not solution of the standard HJI equation: indeed V does not satisfy a dynamic programming principle in a classical
sense.
An important current in Mathematical Finance is the modeling of insider trading (see for example Amendinger, Becherer, Schweizer [2] or Corcuera, Imkeller, Kohatsu-Higa, Nualart [7] and references therein). The basic question studied in these works is to evaluate how the addition of knowledge for a trader-i.e., mathematically, the addition to the original filtration of a variable depending on the future-shows up in his investing strategies, and an important tool is the theory of enlargement of filtrations. Our approach is completely different. Indeed, what is important in our game is not that the players have "more" information than what is contained in the filtration of the Brownian motion, but that their information differs from that of their opponent. In some sense we try to understand the strategic role of information in the game.
The model described above is strongly inspired by a similar one studied by Aumann and Maschler in the framework of repeated games. Since their seminal papers (reproduced in [3] ), this model has attracted a lot of attention in game theory (see [11] , [13] , [15] , [16] ).
However it is only recently that the first author has adapted the model to deterministic differential games (see [5] , [6] ).
The aim of this paper is to generalize the results of [5] to stochastic differential games and to game with integral payoffs. There are several difficulties towards this aim. First the notion of strategies for stochastic differential games is quite intricated (see [12] , [14] ). For our game it is all the more difficult that the players have to introduce additional noise in their strategies in order to confuse their oponent. One of the achievements of this paper is an important simplification of the notion of strategy which allows the introduction of the notion of random strategies. This also simplifies several proofs of [5] . Second the existence of a value for "classical" stochastic differential games relies on a comparison principle for some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Here we have to be able to compare functions satisfying the condition (i,ii,iv) defined above with functions satisfying (i,iii,iv). While for deterministic differential games (i.e., first order HJI equations) we could do this without too much trouble (see [5] ), for stochastic differential games (i.e., second order HJI equations) the proof is much more involved. In particular it requires a new maximum principle for lower semicontinuous functions (see the appendix) which is the most technical part of the paper.
The paper is organized in the following way: in section 2, we introduce the main notations and the notion of random strategies and we define the value functions of our game.
In section 3 we prove that the value functions (and more precisely the convex and concave conjugates) are sub-and supersolutions of some HJ equation. Section 4 is devoted to the comparison principle and to the existence of the value. In Section 5 we investigate stochastic differential games with a running cost. The appendix is devoted to a new maximum principle.
2 Definitions.
The dynamics.
Let T > 0 be a fixed finite time horizon. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IR n , we consider the following doubly controlled stochastic system : dX s = b(s, X s , u s , v s )ds + σ(s, X s , u s , v s )dB s , s ∈ [t, T ],
where B is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a given probability space (Ω, F, P ).
For s ∈ [t, T ], we set F t,s = σ{B r − B t , r ∈ [t, s]} ∨ P,
where P is the set of all null-sets of P .
The processes u and v are assumed to take their values in some compact metric spaces (H) b and σ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x), uniformly in
We also assume Isaacs' condition : for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IR n , p ∈ IR n , and all A ∈ S n (where S n is the set of symmetric n × n matrices) holds:
n ) the set of continuous maps from [t, T ] to IR n .
Admissible controls.

Definition 2.1 An admissible control u for player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is a process taking
values in U (resp. V ), progressively measurable with respect to the filtration (F t,s , s ≥ t).
The set of admissible controls for player I (resp. II) on [t, T ] is denoted by U(t) (resp. V(t)).
We identify two processes u and u in U(t) if P {u = u a.e. in [t, T ]} = 1.
Under assumption (H), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × IR n and (u, v) ∈ U(t) × V(t), there exists a unique solution to (2.1) that we denote by X t,x,u,v
The same holds for v, what permits us to define the process X t,x,u,v · on [t, t + δ) as a solution of the system (2.1) restricted on the interval [t, t + δ).
Now suppose that u, v and X t,x,u,v · are P −a.s. defined uniquely on some interval [t, t + kδ), k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. This allows us to set,
where
as a random variable with values in the set of paths C([t, T ), IR n ), it is clear that the map (s, ω) → u s (ω) (defined on [t + kδ, t + (k + 1)δ) × Ω) as the composition of the Borel measurable application α with the map (s, ω) In the frame of incomplete information it is necessary to introduce random strategies.
In contrast with [5] and [6] , where the random probabilities are supposed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, play a random strategy will consist here to choose some strategy in a finite set of possibilities, i.e. the involved probabilities are finite. It is not clear if this assumption is more realistic nor if the notation will be lighter, nevertheless this alternative allows us to avoid some technical steps of measure theory, in a paper that is already technical enough.
Notation: For R ∈ IN * , let ∆(R) be the set of all (r 1 , . . . , r R ) ∈ [0, 1] R that satisfy R n=1 r n = 1. We define a random strategy α for player I by α = (α 1 , . . . α R ; r 1 , . . . , r R ), with R ∈ IN * ,
The heuristic interpretation ofᾱ is that player I's strategy amounts to choose the pure strategy α k with probability r k .
We define in a similar way the random strategies for player II, and denote by A r (t) (resp. B r (t)) the set of all random strategies for player I (resp. player II).
Finally, identifying α ∈ A(t) with (α; 1) ∈ A r (t), we can write A(t) ⊂ A r (t), and the same holds for B(t) and B r (t).
The payoff.
Fix I, J ∈ IN * .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ J, let g ij : IR n → IR be the terminal payoffs. We assume that For (p, q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J), with p = (p 1 , . . . , p I ), q = (q 1 , . . . q J ), we denote with a hat the elements of (A r (t)) I (resp. (B r (t)) J ):α = (α 1 , . . . , α I ),β = (β 1 , . . . , β J ).
We adopt following notations :
For fixed (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} and strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t), the payoff of the game with only one possible terminal payoff function g ij will be denoted by
Now let (α, β) ∈ A r (t) × B r (t) be two random strategies, with α = (α 1 , . . . , α R ; r 1 , . . . , r R ) and β = (β 1 , . . . , β S ; s 1 , . . . , s S ). The payoff associated with the pair (α, β) ∈ A r (t)×B r (t)), is the average of the payoffs with respect to the probability distributions associated to the strategies:
Further, for p ∈ ∆(I), j ∈ {1, . . . , J},α ∈ (A r (t)) I and β ∈ B r (t) we will use the notation
A symmetric notation holds for α ∈ A r (t) andβ ∈ (B r (t)) J . Finally, the payoff of the
The reference to (t, x) in the notations is dropped when there is no possible confusion : we will write J ij (α, β), J ij (α, β), . . ..
We define the value functions for the game by
Again we will write V + (p, q) and V − (p, q) if there is no possible confusion on (t, x).
The following lemma follows easily from classical estimations for stochastic differential equations :
Lemma 2.2 V + and V − are bounded, Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, p, q and
Hölder continuous with respect to t.
Following [3] we now state one of the basic properties of the value functions. The technique of proof of this statement is known as the splitting method in repeated game theory (see [3] , [16] ).
are convex in p and concave in q.
Proof: We only prove the result for V + , the proof for V − is the same. First V + can be rewritten as
It follows that V + is concave in q.
Now fix q ∈ ∆(J) and let p, p ′ ∈ ∆(I) and a ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality we can assume that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, p i and p ′ i are not simultaneously equal to zero. We get a new element of ∆(I) if we set p a = ap
We define a new strategyα a = (α a 1 , . . . , α a I ) by
(it is easy to check thatα a ∈ (A r (t)) I ).
This means that, for allβ ∈ (B r (t)) J ,
Thus sup 3 Subdynamic programming and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for the Fenchel conjugates.
Since V + and V − are convex with respect to p and concave with respect to q, it is natural to introduce the Fenchel conjugates of these functions. For this we use the following notations.
For any w : [0, T ] × IR n × ∆(I) × ∆(J) → IR, we define the Fenchel conjugate w * of w with respect to p by
For w defined on the dual space [0, T ] × IR n × IR I × ∆(J), we also set
It is well known that, if w is convex, we have (w * ) * = w.
We also have to introduce the concave conjugate with respect to q of a map w :
We use the following notations for the sub-and superdifferentials with respect top andq
In this chapter, we will show that V +♯ and V − * satisfy a subdynamic programming
property. This part follows several ideas of [10] , [11] .
Proof. We begin to establish a first expression for V − * :
(the difference with (3.5) is that player I here can use random strategies.)
Let's denote by e = e(p, q) the right hand term of (3.6). First we prove that e is convex with respect top :
Fix q ∈ ∆(J),p,p ′ ∈ IR I and a ∈ (0, 1).
For ǫ > 0, letβ (resp.β ′ )∈ (B r (t)) J be some ǫ-optimal strategy for e(p, q) (resp. e(p ′ , q)).
We define a new strategyβ a ∈ (B r (t)) J by
Let α ∈ A r (t). Since the application (
Since ǫ is arbitrary, we can deduce that e is convex with respect top.
The next step is to prove that e * = V − . By the convexity of e, this will imply that V − * = e.
We can reorganize e * (p, q) as follows :
The supremum overp ∈ IR I is attained forp i ′ = inf α∈Ar(t) J q i ′ (α,β) and we get the claimed result.
Finally, to get (3.5), it remains to show that player I can use non random strategies.
Indeed, writing V − * as in (3.6) and since A(t) ⊂ A r (t), it is obvious that the left hand side of (3.5) is not smaller than the right hand side.
Concerning the reverse inequality, we can write
The result follows after one recalls that
For ǫ > 0, let β ǫ ∈ B(t 0 ) be ǫ-optimal for V − * 1 (t 0 , t 1 , x 0 ,p, q), and, for all x ∈ IR n , let
. By the uniformly Lipschitz assumptions for the parameters of the dynamics, there exists R > 0 such that, for all α ∈ A(t 0 ),
where B(x 0 , R) denotes the ball in IR n of center x 0 and radius R.
Remark that J q i and V − * are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x. This implies that we can find r > 0 such that, for any x ∈ IR n and y ∈ B(x, r),β x is 2ǫ-optimal for V − * (t 1 , y,p, q).
Eachβ m is detailed in the following way: Let δ be a common delay forβ 0 , . . . ,β M that we can choose as small as we need :
, where C > 0 is defined through the parameters of the dynamics by
. Set E 0 = B(x 0 , R) c . We are now able to define a new strategy for player II,β ǫ ∈ (B r (t 0 )) J :
We set β
For some fixed α ∈ A(t 0 ) and f ∈ C([t 0 , t 1 ], IR n ), we define a new strategy α f ∈ A(t 1 ) by:
It follows that
And max i∈{1,...,
by the choice of (β m , m ∈ {1, . . . , M }) and where K is an upper bound of |g|.
By the choice of R and with the notation K(p) = 4 max i∈{1,...,I} {|p i | + K} + ǫ, we get
(for the last inequality, recall that β ǫ was chosen ǫ-optimal for V − * 1 (t 0 , t 1 , x 0 ,p, q)). We can deduce the result.
2
A classical consequence of the subdynamic programming principle for V − * is that this function is a subsolution of some associated Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We give a proof of that result for sake of completeness.
is a subsolution in the viscosity sense of
We have to prove that
Suppose that this is false and consider θ > 0 such that
Since, for fixedp, V − * is bounded, we can choose φ such that φ t and D 2 φ are also bounded.
It follows that, for some K > 0, we have |Λ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ K.
Now the relation (3.9) is equivalent to
This implies the existence of a control v 0 ∈ V such that, for all u ∈ U ,
Moreover, since Λ is continuous in (t, x), uniformly in u, v, we can find R > 0 such that,
Now define a strategy for player II by
Fix ǫ > 0 and t ∈ (t 0 , R). Because of the subdynamical programming (Proposition 3.1), there exists α ǫ,t ∈ A(t 0 ) such that Now we write Itô's formula for φ(t, X t ):
By (3.11), (3.12) and the definition of φ, we have
In the other hand, there exists a constant C > 0 depending only on the parameters of X, such that
Following (3.10), this implies that, for all t ∈ [t 0 , T ∧ (t 0 + R)],
By (3.13) and (3.14), we now have
Since t − t 0 and ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small, we get a contradiction. 2
For V + we have:
Proposition 3.2 (Superdynamic programming and HJI equation for
As a consequence, for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × IR J , V +♯ (·, ·, p,q) is a supersolution in viscosity sense of
(3.15)
Proof : We note that V + is equal to the opposite of the lower value of the game in which we replace g ij by −g ij , Player I is the maximizer and in which the respective roles of p and q are exchanged. Using Proposition 3.1 in this framework gives the superdynamic programming principle. Now Corollary 3.1 shows that, for any (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × IR J ,
is a subsolution of
Hence V +♯ (·, ·, p, −q) is a supersolution of
Since this holds true for any (p,q), this proves our claim. 2
Comparison principle and existence of a value
In this section we first state a new comparison principle and apply it to get the existence and the characterization of the value. Then we give a proof for the comparison principle.
Statement of the comparison principle and existence of a value
→ IR be continuous and satisfy
where ω is continuous and non decreasing with ω(0) = 0, for any a,
in the dual sense of equation
if w = w(t, x, p, q) is lower semicontinuous, concave with respect to q and if, for any
has a maximum at some point (t,x) for some (p,q) ∈ IR I × ∆(J), we have
We say that w is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense if w is upper semicontinuous, convex with respect to p and if, for any
A solution of (4.17) in the dual sense is a map which is sub-and supersolution in the dual sense.
Remarks :
1. We have proved in Corollary 3.1 that V − is a dual supersolution of the HJ equation
where H − is defined by (3.8), while Proposition 3.2 shows that V + is a dual subsolution of the HJ equation
where H − is defined by (3.15).
2. The necessity to deal with a Hamiltonian H with a (p, q) dependence will become clear in the next section where we study differential games with running costs.
3. An equivalent definition of the notion of dual super-or subsolution in given in Lemma 5.3 below.
The main result of this section is the following: Assume that
Remark : For simplicity we are assuming here that w 1 and w 2 are Hölder continuous and bounded. These assumptions could be relaxed by standard (but painfull) techniques.
We do not know if the uniform Lipschitz continuity assumption on w 1 with respect to q and on w 2 with respect to p can be relaxed.
As a consequence we have 
Theorem 4.2 (Existence of a value) Under assumptions (H), (2.4) and (2.2), the game has a value:
V + (t, x, p, q) = V − (t, x, p, q) ∀(t, x, p, q) ∈ (0, T ) × IR n × ∆(I) × ∆(J) . Furthermore V + = V − isV + (T, x, p, q) = V − (T, x, p, q) = I i=1 J j=1 p i q j g ij (x) ∀(x, p, q) ∈ IR n × ∆(I) × ∆(J) .
Proof of Theorem 4.2 :
The Hamiltonian H defined by (2.2) is known to satisfy 
Proof of the comparison principle
The proof of Theorem 4.1 relies on two arguments: first on a reformulation of the notions of sub-and supersolutions by using sub-and superjets; second on a new maximum principle described in the appendix.
Let us recall the notions of sub-and superjets of a function w : (0, T ) × IR n → IR: the subjet D 2,− w(t,x) is the set of (ξ t , ξ x , X) ∈ IR n+1 × S n such that
and the superjet D 2,+ w is given by
When w depends on other variables ((p, q) or (p,q) for instance), D 2,− w and D 2,+ w always denote the sub-and superjets with respect to the (t, x) variables only. For w = w(t, x, p,q), we set
We use a symmetric notation for D 2,+ w(t,x,p, q).
The following equivalent formulation of the notion of sub-and supersolution is standard in viscosity solution theory, so we omit the proof:
supersolution of equation (4.17) in the dual sense if and only if w = w(t, x, p, q) is lower semicontinuous, concave
with respect to q and if, for any (t,x,p,q) and any (ξ t , ξ x , X) ∈ D 2,+ w * (t,x,p,q) we have
Symmetrically w is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense if and only if w is upper semicontinuous, convex with respect to p and if, for any (t,x,p,q) and any
Proof of Theorem 4.1 : Let us assume that sup t,x,p,q
Since w 1 and w 2 are Hölder continuous and bounded, classical arguments show that M ǫ,η,α := sup t,x,s,y,p,q and that
where M ∞ = |w 1 | ∞ + |w 2 | ∞ . Using (4.18) and the Hölder continuity of w 1 and w 2 shows thatt < T ands < T as soon as ǫ, η and α are small enough.
¿From the maximum principle (Theorem 6.1 stated in the Appendix), there are (p,q), (p,q) and X 1 , X 2 ∈ S n such that
and
Since w 1 is a subsolution of (4.17) in the dual sense andq ∈ ∂ − q w ♯ 2 (t,x,p,q), Proposition 4.3 states that
In the same way, since w 2 is a supersolution of (4.17) in the dual sense andp ∈ ∂
Using the structure condition (4.16) on H, and plugging estimates (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21) into (4.22) and (4.23) yields to a contradiction for ǫ, α and η sufficiently small as in [9] . 2
Games with running cost
We now investigate differential games with asymmetric information on the running cost and on the terminal cost. The framework is basically the same as before. At the initial time, the cost (now consisting in a running cost and a terminal one) is chosen at random among I × J possible costs. The index i is announced to Player I while the index j is announced to Player II. Then the players play the game in order, for Player I to minimize the payoff and for Player II to maximize it.
In this section we keep the same terminology and the same notations as in the previous part. There is however a main difference: as we shall see later, in a game with a running cost, each player needs the knowledge of this running cost to build his strategy. Since we assume that the running cost depends on the control of both players, this means that the players have to observe the control of their opponent. This was not the case of the game before where the players only observed the state of the system. For this reason we have to change the notion of strategy: in this section the notion of strategies introduced in Definition 2.2 is replaced by the following one:
Definition 5.1 A strategy for player I starting at time t is a Borel-measurable map α :
We define strategies for player II in a symmetric way and denote by A(t) (resp. B(t)) the set of strategies for player I (resp. player II).
We define random strategies as before (but with the modified notion of strategies) and still denote by A r (t) (resp. B r (t)) the set of random strategies for player I (resp. player II).
We have an analogue of Lemma 2.1 :
for all (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t), there exists a unique
couple of controls (u, v) ∈ U(t) × V(t) that satisfies P −a.s. For fixed (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J} and strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t), we set
where as before (α, β) denotes the unique pair of controls such that (5.24) holds.
The payoff of two random strategies (α, β) ∈ A r (t)×B r (t), with α = (α 1 , . . . , α R ; r 1 , . . . , r R ) and β = (β 1 , . . . , β S ; s 1 , . . . , s S ), is the average of the payoffs with respect to the probability distributions associated to the strategies:
Finally, the payoff of the game is, for (α,β) = (
We define the value functions for the game with running cost as before by
In our game with running cost, Isaacs' assumption takes the following form: for all
We set with terminal condition
Theorem 5.2 Assume that (H), (5.25) and (5.26) hold. Then the game has a value:
In order to prove Theorem 5.2 it will be convenient to have the following equivalent definition of dual solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (5.27):
Lipschitz continuous with respect to p and concave with respect to q. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) w is a dual supersolution of (5.27 ).
(ii) for any (p,q) ∈ IR I × ∆(J), for any C 2 test function φ = φ(t, x) such that
Remark : A symmetric statement holds for dual subsolutions.
Proof of Lemma 5.3 : Let us assume that w is a supersolution and let φ ∈ C 2 ,
has a global minimum at some point (t,x,p) ∈ [0, T )×IR N ×∆(I). We note that this implies thatp ∈ ∂ − p w * (t,x,p,q). Moreover, taking the supremum over p in (5.29), we have that (t, x) → −φ(t, x) − w * (t, x,p,q) has a global minimum at (t,x). Since w * is a subsolution of the dual equation, we get
Whence inequality (5.28). Conversely let us assume that w satisfies (ii). Let φ be a C 2 test function such that
. Without loss of generality we can assume that this maximum is a global one. Letp ∈ ∂ − p w * (t,x,p,q). ¿From the definition of w * , we also have that (t, x, p) → p, p − w(t, x, p,q) − φ(t, x) has a global maximum at (t,x,p), i.e., (t, x, p) → w(t, x, p,q) + φ(t, x) − p, p has a global minimum at (t,x,p). From (5.28) we get
Proof of Theorem 5.2 : Following standard arguments, one first checks that V + and V − are globally Hölder continuous, and uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to p and q. In order to prove other properties of the value functions, let us introduce an extended differential game in IR n+IJ . This game with asymmetric information and terminal payoff is defined by the dynamics
where (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ] × IR n × IR IJ , with z = (z ij ), and the terminalg ij (x, z) = z ij + g ij (x).
We denote byṼ + andṼ − the upper and lower value of this game. We note that
Following the proofs of Proposition 2.1, one can check thatṼ + andṼ − are convex in p and concave in q. Hence so are V + and V − . As in Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, one can also show thatṼ − is a dual supersolution of the HJ equatioñ
where, for (t, x, z) ∈ IR n+IJ , ξ x ∈ IR n , ξ z ∈ IR IJ and A ∈ S n ,
+ is a dual subsolution of the HJ equatioñ 
is a dual subsolution of the HJ equation
Isaacs' assumption, which states that H := H + = H − , the fact that H satisfies assumption (4.16 ) and the comparison principle shows that V + = V − is the unique dual solution of (5.27). 
has a maximum at (x,ȳ).
Then, for any ǫ > 0, there are (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J), (p,q) ∈ IR I × IR J and (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ S n 1 × S n 2 such that the map
has a maximum at (x,ȳ,p,q),
Remark : Compared with the classical maximum principle, the additional difficulty here is the fact that we need elements of D 2,− w ♯ 1 and of D 2,+ w * 2 while we have only information on the behavior of the difference w 1 − w 2 − φ.
Proof of Theorem 6.1 : We follow closely the proof of Theorem 3.2 of [9] . Let us start by some reductions:
Reductions :
As in [9] , we can assume without loss of generality that O k = IR n k ,
x =ȳ = 0 and φ(x, y) = A(x, y).(x, y) and max x,y,p,q
We can also assume that, for any (
Indeed, let us assume that Theorem 6.1 holds true under this additionnal assumption and let us prove that it holds true without. Let
Among the (p, q) for which z(x,ȳ, p, q) has a maximum, let us choose (p 0 ,q 0 ) such that the total number of indices i and j for which (p 0 ) i = 0 or (q 0 ) j = 0 is maximal. Let us denote by I ′ and J ′ the set of indices i and j for which (p 0 ) i > 0 and (q 0 ) j > 0. We then define
as the natural restriction of w 1 , w 2 , z,p 0 andq 0 to ∆(I ′ ) and ∆(J ′ ). We note that (x,ȳ,p ′ 0 ,q ′ 0 ) is a maximum point of z on IR n 1 +n 2 × ∆(I ′ ) × ∆(J ′ ) and that assumption (6.36) holds, since otherwise one would have a contradiction with the particular choice of (p 0 ,q 0 ).
Using now Theorem 6.1 with assumption (6.36), we can build
and (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ S n 1 × S n 2 such that (6.32), (6.33) and (6.34) hold. Then we extend (p ′ ,q ′ ) to (p,q) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J) by settingp i =p ′ i for i ∈ I ′ andp i = 0 otherwise, andq j =q j for j ∈ J ′ andq j = 0 otherwise. We also extend q ′ toq ∈ ∂ + q w 1 (x,p,q) andq ′ toq ∈ ∂ + q w 1 (x,p,q) by settingq j = M for j ∈ J\J ′ and p i = −M for i ∈ I\I ′ , where M is a Lipschitz constant of w 1 and w 2 with respect to q and p respectively. This definesp,q,q,p and (X 1 , X 2 ) for which (6.32), (6.33) and (6.34) hold.
So it remains to prove that Theorem 6.1 holds true under the additional assumption (6.36).
Step 1 : introduction of the inf-and supconvolutions. As in [9] , we have
for any (x, x ′ , y, y ′ , p, q), where λ = 1 ǫ + A . Let us set for λ ′ ∈ (0, λ),
With these definition we have thatŵ 1 is semiconvex in all its variables with a modulus λ ′ , semiconvex in x with a modulus λ and convex in p (because w 1 is convex in p by assumption).
In the same way,ŵ 2 is semiconcave in all its variables with a modulus λ ′ , semiconvex in y with a modulus λ and concave in q (because w 2 is concave in q by assumption). Moreover
Since w 1 ≤ŵ 1 and w 2 ≥ŵ 2 , there are some (p, q) such that equality holds in (6.37) at (0, 0, p, q). Furthermore, if equality holds at (0, 0, p, q), then (0, 0, p, q) is a maximum point in (6.35) and assumption (6.36) states that (p, q) belongs to the interior of ∆(I) × ∆(J).
Step 2 : use of Jensen maximum principle. Let us now introduce some small pertubation of the equation: for α > 0 and ζ = (ζ x , ζ y , ζ p , ζ q ) ∈ IR n 1 +n 2 +I+J , we set
Note that, because of the penalisation term α(|x| 2 + |y| 2 ), for any η > 0, we can choose γ small enough such that, for any ζ such that |ζ| ≤ γ, any maximum of z ζ is of the form (x, y, p, q) for some (x, y) ∈ B η . Let γ as above. Since z 0 is semiconvex, has a maximum at (0, 0, p, q), Jensen maximum principle (see Lemma A.3 of [9] for instance) states that the set
(i) z ζ has a maximum at (x, y, p, q) and
(ii)ŵ 1 andŵ 2 have a derivative at (x, y, p, q)
has a positive measure. We note that in the quoted Lemma A.3, the maximum is required to be strict ; this assumption is only used in [9] to localize the maximum points, which is not needed here.
We also note for later use that, if (x, y, p, q) ∈ E γ , there is some ζ = (ζ x , ζ y , ζ p , ζ q ) with |ζ| ≤ γ such that z ζ has a maximum at (x, y, p, q). In particular, this implies that
has a maximum at q. Sinceŵ 2 is concave in q,ŵ 1 coincides with its concave hull with respect to q at (x, p, q). Hence, if we setq = ∂ŵ 1 (x,p,q) ∂q , then
In the same way, if we setp = ∂ŵ 2 (y,p,q) ∂p , then we havê
Step 3 : measure estimate of a subset of E γ . Let E ′ γ be the set of points (x, y, p, q) ∈ E γ such thatŵ ♯ 1 has a second order Taylor expansion at (x, p,
∂q (x, p, q)) andŵ * 2 has a second order Taylor expansion at (y,
∂p (x, p, q), q). Our aim is to show that E ′ γ has a full measure in E γ . ∂p (x, p, q), q) It is therefore enough to show that E 1 γ and E 2 γ have a full measure in E γ . We only do the proof for E 1 γ , the proof for E 2 γ being symmetric. Let us set, for any (x, y, p),
For this we note that E
Since E γ has a positive measure, from Fubini Theorem we have to show that, for any (x, y, p) such that the set E γ (x, y, p) has a positive measure, the set E 1 γ (x, y, p) has a full measure in E γ (x, y, p).
For this, let us introduce the map Φ : q → ∂ŵ 1 (x,p,q) ∂q defined on E γ (x, y, p). We are going to show that ∀q 1 , q 2 ∈ E γ (x, y, p), |q 1 − q 2 | ≤ 1 2α |Φ(q 1 ) − Φ(q 2 )| , (6.40) which will imply that
where L J denotes the Lebesgue measure in IR J . Then we will prove that (6.41) implies our claim.
Proof of (6.40) : Let q 1 , q 2 ∈ E γ (x, y, p). There are ζ 1 and ζ 2 such that z ζ k has a maximum at (x, y, p, q k ) for k = 1, 2. The first order optimality conditions imply that Φ(q k ) = ∂ŵ 2 (y, p, q k ) ∂q − 2αq k + ζ k,q for k = 1, 2.
Using again the optimality of z ζ 1 at q 1 and the fact that q →ŵ 2 (y, p, q) is concave, we havê w 1 (x, p, q 2 ) ≤ŵ 1 (x, p, q 1 ) + Reversing the role of q 1 and q 2 giveŝ w 1 (x, p, q 1 ) ≤ŵ 1 (x, p, q 2 ) + Φ(q 2 ), (q 1 − q 2 ) − α|q 2 − q 1 | 2 Adding the two previous inequalities then leads to 0 ≤ (Φ(q 2 ) − Φ(q 1 )).(q 1 − q 2 ) − 2α|q 2 − q 1 | 2 .
Whence (6.40).
Proof of (6.41) : Let E be a measurable subset of E γ (x, y, p). We note that (6.40) states that Φ is a bijection between E and its image, with a 1 2α −Lipschitz continuous inverse. Hence
i.e., (6.41) holds.
We finally show that E 1 γ (x, y, p) has a full measure in E γ (x, y, p) for any (x, y, p) such that E γ (x, y, p) has a positive measure. Let F be the set of (x, p,q) such thatŵ ♯ 1 has a second order Taylor expansion at (x, p,q). Since F has a full measure, for almost all (x, p) ∈ IR n × ∆(I), the set F (x, p) = {q ∈ IR J , (x, p,q) ∈ F } has a full measure in IR J . Let (x, p) be such a pair and such that E γ (x, y, p) has a positive measure. Then Φ(E γ (x, y, p)) also has a positive measure from (6.41). Since Φ(E γ (x, y, p))\F (x, p) has a zero measure and since Φ −1 (Φ(E γ (x, y, p))\F (x, p)) = E γ (x, y, p)\E 1 γ (x, y, p) , using again (6.41) shows that E γ (x, y, p)\E 1 γ (x, y, p) has a zero measure. This completes our claim.
Step 4 : (further) magic properties of sup-convolution. We now explain that one can use second order Taylor expansions ofŵ (q ′ .q + λ 2 |x ′ − x| 2 + λ ′ 2 |q" − q ′ | 2 ) − w 1 (x ′ , p, q")) (6.42) ¿From (6.38), we have thatŵ 1 (x, p, q)+ŵ ♯ 1 (x, p,q) = q.q and q ∈ ∂ + qŵ ♯ 1 (x, p,q). In particular, q ′ = q is a minimum point in (6.42). Since q belongs to the interior of ∆(J), the optimality conditions imply that, if (x ′ , q, q") is a minimum of (6.42), then q = q" − 2 (x n , p n , q n ) ,
Since furthermore (x, y) → z ζn (x, y, p n , q n ) has a maximum at (x n , y n , p n , q n ), the first and second order optimality conditions imply that (−ξ n 1 , ξ n 2 ) = (A + ǫA 2 )(x n , y n ) + 2α n (x n , y n ) + (ζ 
